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ARTICLES
OHIO ISSUE 1 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
WILSON HUHN*
This article discusses the constitutionality of Ohio Issue 1, an
amendment to the state constitution that was adopted in a referendum
by the people of the State of Ohio in November, 2004. The article
consists of two parts. Part I sets forth arguments in support of the
proposition that Ohio Issue 1 is unconstitutional. Part II sets forth
arguments that have been or may be raised in support of Ohio Issue 1,
and responds to each of those arguments.
I. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
OHIO ISSUE 1
Ohio Issue 1 consists of two sentences. It states:
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage
valid in or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions. This
state and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal
status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to ap-
proximate the design, qualities, significance, or effect of marriage.
Both sentences of Ohio Issue 1 should be held unconstitutional.
The first sentence is unconstitutional because it violates the funda-
mental right of marriage. The second sentence is unconstitutional be-
cause it establishes different rules for different people who are
seeking the aid of the government.
Let's consider the first sentence, dealing with the right to marry.
The Supreme Court has recognized that marriage is a fundamental
right in many cases involving heterosexual couples; These cases in-
clude Griswold v. Connecticut,2 Zablocki v. Redhail,3 Meyer v. Ne-
* B.A. Yale University, 1972; J.D. Cornell Law School, 1977; C. Blake McDowell, Jr.,
Professor of Law. The first portion of this article was presented at a Town Hall Meeting on Issue
1: Ohio's Marriage Amendment, sponsored by the Gay Straight Law Alliance, the Law Associa-
tion for Women, the Federalist Society, the ACLU Student Organization, and the Department of
Student Life, and held at The University of Akron on April 7, 2005. I wish to thank my research
assistant, Emily Durway, for her indispensable research aid, and Professor Tracy Thomas for her
valuable comments and suggestions.
1. OHIo CONST. art. XV, § 11 (hereinafter Ohio Issue 1).
2. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating Connecticut statute prohibit-
ing the use of contraceptives as applied to married couples).
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braska,4 and Skinner v. Oklahoma.5 For example, in Loving v.
Virginia,6 Chief Justice Earl Warren stated: "Marriage is one of the
'basic civil rights of man.
''7
Not only has the Court made it clear that marriage is a fundamental
right, it has explicitly said why it is a fundamental right. The Court
has explained that marriage is a fundamental right because it is an
intensely personal decision that is critically important in the life of the
individual. In Griswold, Justice William 0. Douglas said:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully en-
during, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not politi-
cal faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.8
The supporters of Ohio Issue 1 are likely in agreement with the
Supreme Court on this point, and they would likely agree with the
Court that marriage is "sacred" and "noble." Opponents of Issue 1
also agree with this assessment. They, too, believe that marriage is a
fundamental right, and they agree that it is a fundamental right for the
very same reasons. In addition, they perceive marriage to be a pillar
of our society, the bedrock of the family, and a key to personal happi-
ness. It is because of this that they wish to extend the benefits of mar-
riage to those same-sex couples who desire it.
But supporters of Issue 1 differ in one key respect from the oppo-
nents. Supporters of Issue 1, although believing marriage to be of fun-
damental importance in the lives of heterosexual couples, implicitly
deny that marriage is important to same-sex couples. They consider
marriage to be fundamentally important for themselves, but appar-
ently unimportant and insignificant in the lives of others. They neces-
sarily think that their own intimate relationships are sacred and noble,
but that the intimate relationships of same-sex couples are not sacred,
not noble. This belief is mistaken. If marriage is a fundamental right
for heterosexuals because of its centrality in people's lives, it is equally
3. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating Wisconsin statute prohibiting any
person from marrying if he or she had an obligation to support children not in his or her custody,
absent judicial finding that the children were not likely to become public charges).
4. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating Nebraska statute prohibiting the
teaching of any modern language other than English in any public or private school).
5. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating Oklahoma statute that allowed
the sterilization of felons convicted of three or more crimes of moral turpitude).
6. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating Virginia statute prohibiting interracial
marriage).
7. Id. at 12.
8. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 28:1
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a fundamental right for same-sex couples who find that marriage has
the same meaning for them.
The principal reason that was given for the adoption of Ohio Issue 1
is that same-sex marriage threatens "the institution of marriage,"9 but
one may fairly ask, what is "the institution of marriage?" Is it any
particular marriage, or perhaps all marriages? No person has come
forward to say that his or her own marriage will be harmed if gays and
lesbians are allowed to wed, nor does it seem likely that this is what is
meant by the assertion that gay marriage will harm "the institution of
marriage."
Instead, what is meant by this argument is that gay marriage will do
harm to its opponents' conception of marriage. It is their mindset,
their ideas, their opinions, their attitudes that are threatened. So far
as supporters of Ohio Issue 1 are concerned, what is important here
are their beliefs. It has not been suggested that any objective harm
will befall any person if same-sex couples are allowed to marry. In-
stead, it is asserted that if same-sex couples are allowed to marry, this
will diminish the importance of marriage in some people's minds. In
their opinion, marriage will become less sacred, less noble, less valua-
ble, less desirable a state, if gays and lesbians are admitted to the
institution.
This argument quite clearly exposes the assumptions of the amend-
ment's supporters. In their opinion, homosexual relationships are not
sacred, they are not noble, they are not valuable, they are not desira-
ble, and it therefore debases marriage to admit same-sex couples to
"the institution of marriage."
People are constitutionally permitted to hold this opinion. People
have the constitutional right to express this opinion. What our Consti-
tution does not permit, however, is to enact this opinion into law
through the adoption of legislation such as Ohio Issue 1.10 According
to myriad decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, ani-
mosity, irrational fear, and mere disapproval are illegitimate reasons
for the enactment of any law."
As for the second sentence of Ohio Issue 1, it is clearly unconstitu-
tional under a line of Supreme Court cases culminating in Romer v.
9. See Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579, 597 (2005) (observing that the state had
asserted its interest in "fostering the traditional institution of marriage").
10. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (invalidating court order which had
granted custody of child to father because mother had remarried to a man of a different race,
and stating, "The Constitution cannot control such prejudices, but neither can it tolerate them.
Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
them effect.").
11. See infra notes 119-128 and accompanying text.
2005]
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Evans.12 This series of cases establishes the principle that the govern-
ment may not use one method of governmental decision-making for
one class of persons to enforce rights or obtain benefits, and use an-
other set of rules for another class of persons to enforce the same
rights or to obtain the same benefits.13
The second sentence of Ohio Issue I violates this principle because
it creates different rules for different people, and this is easily demon-
strated by the following examples. Normally, laws governing who
may marry, and what the benefits of marriage shall be, need merely
gain approval from a state or local legislative body. In contrast, laws
benefiting same-sex couples are utterly barred from the legislative
arena. Under Issue 1, this inequality extends to policies as well as
laws. If heterosexual married couples desire to obtain benefits such as
health insurance coverage for spouses from a public employer, all that
needs to happen is for the public employer to agree to extend the
benefits. A university, a county library system, or an agency of the
state government may freely decide, and frequently does decide, to
extend such benefits to the spouses of its employees. Prior to the
adoption of Issue 1, same-sex couples enjoyed the same freedom of
opportunity in soliciting these benefits from state agencies, subdivi-
sions, and institutions. However, after the adoption of Issue 1, it is no
longer possible for a same-sex couple, or a group of them, to convince
a public entity of the wisdom and fairness of extending health care
benefits, routinely extended to heterosexual couples, to same-sex
couples. 4 Ohio Issue 1 makes the structure of governmental decision-
making different for homosexuals than it is for heterosexuals.
12. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating Colorado state constitutional amend-
ment prohibiting state and local governments from enacting antidiscrimination measures pro-
tecting homosexuals).
13. This same strategy of amending the state constitution to prohibit the adoption of protec-
tive legislation was used by the proponents of slavery in the nineteenth century to thwart the
efforts of antislavery organizations. Referring back to the time of the Revolution, Lincoln said,
"In those days, Legislatures held the unquestioned power to abolish slavery in their respective
States; but now it is becoming quite fashionable for State Constitutions to withhold that power
from the Legislatures." Lincoln described the strategies that were employed to entrench slavery
in these unforgettable words:
They have him in his prison house; they have searched his person, and left no prying instru-
ment with him. One after another they have closed the heavy iron doors upon him, and now
they have him, as it were, bolted in with a lock of a hundred keys, which can never be
unlocked without the concurrence of every key; the keys in the hands of a hundred different
men, and they scattered to a hundred different and distant places; and they stand musing as
to what invention, in all the dominions of mind and matter, can be produced to make the
impossibility of his escape more complete than it is.
Abraham Lincoln, Excerpt from speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in II COLLECTrED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 404 (available online at www.hti.umich.edu/l/lincoln) [hereinaf-
ter COLLECTED WORKS].
14. This argument assumes that the Ohio courts will find that granting health insurance
benefits to domestic partners in same-sex unions constitutes the "creation or recognition" of a
[Vol. 28:1
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The leading case on this subject is Romer v. Evans.15 Romer deter-
mined the constitutionality of a ballot initiative called "Amendment
2," which the citizens of Colorado had adopted. Like Ohio Issue 1,
Colorado Amendment 2 amended the state constitution and at-
tempted to deny homosexuals equal access to the governmental pro-
cess. Amendment 2 provided that neither the State of Colorado nor
any of its subdivisions could adopt laws, regulations, or policies for-
bidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.16
In Romer the Court articulated the following governing principle:
A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group
of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself
a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.17
This language from Romer is directly applicable to the question of
the constitutionality of Ohio Issue 1. The second sentence of Ohio
Issue 1 is "a law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for
one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the govern-
ment."18 Accordingly, Ohio issue 1 "is itself a denial of equal protec-
tion of the laws in the most literal sense."'19
At the heart of this debate is a simple moral truth. Same-sex
couples love each other and their children just as much as heterosex-
ual couples do. There is no legitimate reason to deny them the right
to obtain legal recognition of their partnerships and families.
This is not simply my opinion. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme
Court declared:
[O]ur laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela-
tionships, child rearing, and education. In explaining the respect the
Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in making these
choices, we stated as follows:
"legal status" that "approximates" the "design, qualities, significance, or effect of marriage"
within the meaning of Ohio Issue 1.
15. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating state constitutional amendment
prohibiting state and local government from adopting laws banning discrimination based upon
sexual orientation).
16. See id. at 624 (setting forth the Colorado constitutional amendment that was struck
down in Romer, which provided: "No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisex-
ual Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all re-
spects self-executing.").
17. Id. at 633.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20051
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"These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. .. ."
Persons in a homosexual relationship ma y seek autonomy for these
purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.2
The Court repeatedly emphasized that the fundamental right at
stake in Lawrence was not simply the right to engage in certain sexual
conduct, but rather the right to form intimate relationships,2' and the
Court explicitly drew the analogy between homosexual relationships
and marriage:
To say that the issue in Bowers [v. Hardwick] was simply the right to
engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said
marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.22
The Court added: "When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a
personal bond that is more enduring. ' 23 In brushing aside the Texas
law criminalizing "homosexual conduct," the Supreme Court in Law-
rence used such sweeping language that the dissenting Justices, led by
Justice Scalia, contended that although the majority and concurring
opinions were careful to reserve judgment on the question of gay mar-
riage, 24 under their reasoning the Constitution commands that same-
20. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
21. The opening of the Court's opinion signaled that it would focus on the more "transcen-
dent" aspects of the fundamental right to privacy:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or
other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there
are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not
be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an au-
tonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more tran-
scendent dimensions.
Id. at 562.
22. Id. at 567.
23. Id.
24. In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy stated:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured
or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It
does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.
See id. at 578.
Justice O'Connor expressed a similar reservation, implying even more strongly that same-sex
marriage might constitutionally be prohibited:
That this law as applied to private, consensual conduct is unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause does not mean that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and
homosexuals would similarly fail under rational basis review. Texas cannot assert any legiti-
mate state interest here, such as national security or preserving the traditional institution of
marriage. Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations-the asserted state interest in
this case - other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral
disapproval of an excluded group.
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sex marriage must be allowed.25 I agree with Justice Scalia that the
decision of the Court in Lawrence leaves the constitutional arguments
against same-sex marriage "on pretty shaky ground. '26 The language
and logic of the Court's reasoning in Lawrence yields but one conclu-
sion on this subject: gay men and women must be permitted to choose
whom they wish to marry, just like everyone else.
II. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF OHIO ISSUE 1 AND THE
RESPONSES TO THEM
Supporters of Issue 1 have raised eleven arguments to support their
position that Issue 1 is constitutional. These eleven arguments are not
compelling, they are not persuasive, and some of them are not even
legitimate because they are contrary to the Constitution. They are
based upon false assumptions of fact, and they are inconsistent with
fundamental American values of fairness and tolerance. Each of
these arguments is set forth and rebutted below.
1. Marriage Is Defined as the Union of a Man and a Woman
One opponent of same-sex marriage contends that marriage is by
definition between "one man and one woman," and that it makes no
sense to speak of same-sex marriage. He implies that same-sex mar-
riage is a nonsensical concept, an impossible arrangement, one that is
Id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
25. Justice Scalia stated:
This reasoning leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples. Justice O'Connor seeks to preserve them by the conclusory statement that "pre-
serving the traditional institution of marriage" is a legitimate state interest. But "preserving
the traditional institution of marriage" is just a kinder way of describing the State's moral
disapproval of same-sex couples. Texas's interest in [its law prohibiting same-sex sodomy]
could be recast in similarly euphemistic terms: "preserving the traditional sexual mores of
our society." In the jurisprudence Justice O'Connor has seemingly created, judges can vali-
date laws by characterizing them as "preserving the traditions of society" (good); or invali-
date them by characterizing them as "expressing moral disapproval" (bad).
See id. at 601-602 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Scalia later added:
Today's opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinc-
tion to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition
in marriage is concerned. If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is "no legitimate
state interest" for purposes of proscribing that conduct; and if, as the Court coos (casting
aside all pretense of neutrality), "when sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct
with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring;" what justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to
homosexual couples exercising "[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution"? Surely not the
encouragement of procreation, since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry. This
case "does not involve" the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief
that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court.
Id. at 604-605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
26. See supra note 25.
7
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beyond the mind of man to comprehend; analogous, he says, to a
"square circle.",27
This argument is circular in that it assumes its own conclusion; and
it is purely semantic in that it is entirely based upon a traditional un-
derstanding of the meaning of the word "marriage," which is an as-
sumption that opponents of Issue 1 do not share. This argument
amounts to no more than the commonplace observation that, "In the
past, marriage has been understood to be the union of a man and a
woman." It is of course true that in this nation marriage has tradition-
ally been recognized only between a man and a woman; but the argu-
ment set forth in the first portion of this article is that this traditional
understanding is unconstitutional because there is no difference be-
tween heterosexual and homosexual unions that are based on love
and commitment, and because gay and lesbian relationships must be
accorded the same respect as heterosexual relationships.28
2. The Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage Will Lead to the
Legalization of Practices Such as Polygamy and
Prostitution.
Justice Antonin Scalia has argued that granting constitutional pro-
tection for homosexuality undermines all morals legislation,29 and
that, specifically, it will lead to constitutional protection for practices
such as polygamy and prostitution.30
This argument is simply contrary to fact. A gay or lesbian person
who wishes to marry does so for the same reason that a heterosexual
person does: he or she is in love and is willing to commit to one per-
son. Same-sex unions, like heterosexual unions, are the antithesis of
plural marriage and prostitution. Constitutional arguments in support
of same-sex marriage do not detract from the constitutionality of laws
27. See Press Release, ADF Media Relations, ADF and GLAAD Square Off in Marriage
Debate (March 29, 2005) (http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/news/ ) (last visited April 12,
2005) (quoting Jeff Ventrella, Senior Vice President of ADF's Office of Strategic Training) ("Ad-
vocating same-sex 'marriage' is like asking an architect to draw a square circle," Ventrella said.
"Nobody believes in their heart of hearts that it exists. It's time to stop pretending that the law
can draw them.").
28. See supra note 20.
29. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court embraces instead
Justice Stevens' declaration in his Bowers dissent, that 'the fact that the governing majority in a
State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for up-
holding a law prohibiting the practice.' This effectively decrees the end of all morals legisla-
tion.") (citation omitted).
30. See id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ( "State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage,
adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are like-
wise sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single
one of these laws is called into question by today's decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin
the scope of its decision to exclude them from its holding."). See also infra note 53 and accompa-
nying text.
[Vol. 28:1
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prohibiting harmful practices such as polygamy and prostitution.
Quite the contrary, same-sex marriage is a refutation of promiscuous
practices.
3. Same-Sex Marriage Will Harm Families and Is Inconsistent with
Family Values.
This argument is also contrary to fact. The recognition of same-sex
marriage will actually strengthen families, promote monogamy, affirm
the importance of love in all relationships, and facilitate two-parent
households. It will also reinforce the free exercise of religion in that
many same-sex couples presently participate in religious weddings
even though the government does not recognize the legal validity of
their marriage. The legal recognition of same-sex marriage will ac-
commodate their religious beliefs.
4. Constitutional Rights Are Based Exclusively on Tradition.
Opponents of same-sex marriage argue that fundamental rights are
established solely by tradition. There is support for this argument in
language from the opinions of Justice Antonin Scalia in Michael H. v.
Gerald D.31 and former Chief Justice William Rehnquist in Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg.32 Justice Scalia stated, "a rule of law that binds
neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable tradition is no rule of
law at all,"33 while Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that "the outlines of
the 'liberty' specially protected by the Fourteenth Amendment ...
have at least been carefully refined by concrete examples involving
fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted in our legal tradition."34
If it were true that all constitutional rights must be "deeply rooted" in
this nation's history and tradition, Ohio Issue 1 would certainly be
constitutional, because same-sex marriage is not "deeply rooted" in
tradition.
However, it is not true that our fundamental rights are defined
solely by tradition. In both Michael H. and Glucksberg Justice
O'Connor was careful to distance herself from the opinions of Justice
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, thereby depriving each of them of
a majority in support of their limited definition of fundamental right."
31. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding California statute which con-
clusively presumed that a child born to a married woman living with her husband was the child
of the husband).
32. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 707 (1997) (upholding Washington statute forbid-
ding assisted suicide).
33. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
34. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.
35. In Michael H., Justice O'Connor wrote a four-sentence concurring opinion, in which
Justice Kennedy joined, stating:
2005]
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In Lawrence v. Texas the majority of the Supreme Court, led by Jus-
tices Kennedy and O'Connor, emphatically rejected the position of
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist. They instead adopted the
standard for defining fundamental rights that was first articulated in
their plurality opinion from Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, which extends protection to personal and inti-
mate choices regardless of whether they have been traditionally pro-
tected.36 Furthermore, in Lawrence the Court expressly adopted
Justice Stevens' test for measuring the constitutionality of laws affect-
ing such rights, which maintains that traditional notions of morality
are not sufficient to justify laws affecting intimate personal choices.
The Court stated:
In his dissenting opinion in Bowers Justice Stevens came to these
conclusions:
Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the
fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed
a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for up-
holding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition
could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional at-
tack. Second, individual decisions by married persons, concerning
the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not in-
tended to produce offspring, are a form of "liberty" protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover,
this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as
married persons.
Justice Stevens' analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in
Bowers and should control here.37
I concur in all but footnote 6 of Justice Scalia's opinion. This footnote sketches a mode of
historical analysis to be used when identifying liberty interests protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that may be somewhat inconsistent with our past
decisions in this area. On occasion the Court has characterized relevant traditions protect-
ing asserted rights at levels of generality that might not be "the most specific level" availa-
ble. I would not foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of
historical analysis.
491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). In Glucksberg, Justice O'Connor
concurred in the ruling of the Court that there is no general constitutional right to "commit
suicide," but reserved judgment regarding the "narrower question whether a mentally compe-
tent person who is experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in con-
trolling the circumstances of his or her imminent death." Gluscksberg, 521 U.S. at 736
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. See Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also supra note 20
and accompanying text.
37. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-578 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes and citations omitted)). See also Bowers, 478
U.S. 199-200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), stating:
Like Justice Holmes, I believe that "[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of
law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past." I believe we must analyze Hardwick's claim in the light of
the values that underlie the constitutional right to privacy. If that right means anything, it
10
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Religious norms are equally insufficient to support secular legisla-
tion. Justice Blackmun, who also dissented with Justice Stevens in
Bowers, observed that the state's invocation of religious authority
against homosexuality actually undermined its legal argument.38
Equating religious intolerance with racial animus, Justice Blackmun
concluded, "The legitimacy of secular legislation depends instead on
whether the State can advance some justification for its law beyond its
conformity to religious doctrine. ' 39 Under the foregoing "reality-
based" analysis, which is now constitutionally mandated, laws must be
justified by the harm that they seek to prevent. Appeals to traditional
moral or religious beliefs are not enough.
Further support for the ideal of the "living" Constitution comes
from our sixteenth President. Abraham Lincoln believed that the
principle of equality is not a static notion. It is rather a dynamic con-
cept, a moral imperative that constantly challenges us to question our
assumptions about human potential. The Declaration of Indepen-
dence was written by a slaveholder, but here is how Lincoln under-
stood the phrase in the Declaration that "all men are created equal."
I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all
men, but they did not intend to declare all men equal in all respects.
They did not mean to say all were equal in color, size, intellect, moral
developments, or social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinct-
ness, in what respects they did consider all men created equal - equal
in "certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness." This they said, and this they meant. They did
not mean to assert the obvious untruth, that all were then actually
enjoying that equality, nor yet, that they were about to confer it imme-
diately upon them. In fact they had no power to confer such a boon.
They meant simply to declare the right, so that the enforcement of it
might follow as fast as circumstances should permit. They meant to
set up a standard maxim for free society, which should be familiar to
all, and revered by all; constantly looked to, constantly labored for,
and even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated,
and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence, and
means that, before Georgia can prosecute its citizens for making choices about the most
intimate aspects of their lives, it must do more than assert that the choice they have made is
an "'abominable crime not fit to be named among Christians."'
Id. (citations omitted).
38. See Bowers at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("far from buttressing his case, petitioner's
invocation of Leviticus, Romans, St. Thomas Aquinas, and sodomy's heretical status during the
Middle Ages undermines his suggestion that [the Georgia sodomy statute] represents a legiti-
mate use of secular coercive power.").
39. See id. at 211-212 (Blackmun, J.) (stating, "A State can no more punish private behavior
because of religious intolerance than it can punish such behavior because of racial animus.").
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augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people of all colors
everywhere. n
We are constitutionally obligated to constantly look to and con-
stantly labor for the principle of equality. As Justice Kennedy so elo-
quently stated in Lawrence:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components
of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more spe-
cific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can
blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its prin-
ciples in their own search for greater freedom. 41
In the words of James Russell Lowell, "New occasions teach new
duties; Time makes ancient good uncouth; They must upward still and
onward, who would keep abreast of Truth."42
5. There Is No "Emerging Awareness" in Favor of Same-Sex
Marriage
Opponents of same-sex marriage contend that in contrast to the sit-
uation in Lawrence, where most states other than Texas had already
repealed laws criminalizing homosexual sodomy,4 3 with respect to
same-sex marriage the trend is decidedly the other way. 4 Not only
has no state legislatively recognized same-sex marriage, many states
have recently adopted state statutes and state constitutional amend-
ments to explicitly prohibit it. 5 According to this argument, there is
no "emerging awareness" of tolerance for same-sex marriage to
counter the longstanding tradition of marriage being confined to het-
erosexual couples.
40. Abraham Lincoln, Excerpt from Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in II
COLLECTED WORKS 399, 405-406 (available online at www.hti.umich.edu/l/lincoln).
41. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-579.
42. James Russell Lowell, The Present Crisis, available at www.underthesun.cc/Lowell/
PoemsofJamesRussellLowell (last visited Nov. 8, 2005).
43. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (stating, "In our own constitutional system the deficien-
cies in Bowers became even more apparent in the years following its announcement. The 25
States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in the Bowers decision are reduced
now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct. In those States where
sodomy is still proscribed, whether for same-sex or heterosexual conduct, there is a pattern of
nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in private. The State of Texas admitted
in 1994 that as of that date it had not prosecuted anyone under those circumstances.").
44. Jeff Ventrella, Same-Sex Marriage: Speak Now or Forever Hold Your Peace; "Adam and
Eve, Alice and Steve, A Debate of the Legal Issues Surrounding Same-Sex Marriage," Address at
Duke University Law School (April 7, 2004), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast
(Video at 31:00) [hereinafter Same-Sex Marriage].
45. See Marriage Laws: State by State, Family Research Council at http://www.frc.org/get.
cfm?i=IF05D03, (updated April 2005).
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The force of this argument must be conceded. The movement to-
wards societal and legal acceptance of homosexuality has made great
progress, but it still has a long way to go. Laws making sodomy a
criminal act have been invalidated, but gays and lesbians still face
enormous social and legal discrimination. Furthermore, although
some nations that share our commitment to liberty and equality have
recognized same-sex marriage,46 in the United States this question is
just now coming to the fore.
However, despite the recent adoption of laws and state constitu-
tional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage, it is not correct to
say that there is no "emerging awareness" in favor of same-sex unions.
Legislative majorities in some states have voted to authorize "civil un-
ions," which invest homosexual unions with the benefits of marriage
arising under state law.47 In addition, a number of state courts have
declared laws forbidding same-sex marriage to be unconstitutional
under the state or federal constitutions. 48  The social movement in
favor of same-sex marriage has made great strides in a short period of
time. Perhaps the most powerful and moving image from the year
2004 was that of thousands of gay and lesbian couples eagerly seeking
to be married in cities around the nation.49 Ohio Issue 1 and similar
46. See American Bar Association Section of Family Law, A White Paper: An Analysis of
the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 38 FAM. L.Q.
339, 348-349 (2004) (stating, "Presently, three countries allow same-sex couples to marry
(Netherlands, Belgium, and several provinces in Canada). Canada is expected to extend such
privileges to couples throughout the country some time in 2005. In addition to full marriage
rights, many northern European countries allow same-sex couples to enter into legal relation-
ships with most of the rights and responsibilities of marriage.").
47. See, e.g., California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act, 2003 Cal. Legis.
Serv. 421 (West); 2005 CONN. LEGIS. SERV. P.A. 05-10 (West); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §1201-1207
(2002).
48. See, e.g., Coordination Proceeding, Special Title (Rule 1550(C)), Superior Court of the
State of California, County of San Francisco, March 14, 2005 (same); Goodridge v. Dept. of
Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003) (invaliding state civil marriage law under state
constitution insofar as it denied same-sex marriage); Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579
(2005) (invalidating denial of same-sex marriage under Fourteenth Amendment).
49. See Tom Mooney, Across the Bay State, Same Sex Couples Say "I Do," PROVIDENCE
JOURNAL BULLETIN, May 18, 2004 (stating "History was sealed with kisses yesterday as across
Massachusetts, from the Berkshires to crowded Cambridge City Hall, to the jubilant streets of
Provincetown on Cape Cod, same-sex marriage arrived in America. Six months after the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the state's Constitution forbids the creation of 'sec-
ond-class citizens,' hundreds of people whom the court described as being victims of
discrimination, turned out to reap what three years of court battles had sown. In Cambridge
alone, more than 250 couples, joined by thousands of revelers, waited in line early yesterday
morning for the first available marriage licenses. Many capped the momentous occasion with a
quick City Hall wedding amid cheering supporters. For Emily Kay and Anita Saville, of Chelm-
sford, Mass., partners for 21 years, the moment brought on tears: 'I guess it's kind of emotional
when you win your civil rights,' Kay said."); April Umminger, Marriage Put to a Legal Test,
U.S.A. TODAY, March 15, 2005 (reporting that almost 3000 marriage licenses were issued to
same-sex couples in Multnomah County, Oregon, during March and April, 2004); Lisa Leff, On
the Marriage Crusade, THE ADVOCATE, March 15, 2005 (reporting that Mayor Gavin Newsome
13
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legislation that has been enacted in other states represents a backlash
against this emerging awareness of the equality of homosexual unions.
Furthermore, the absence of a national consensus is not a barrier to
finding a constitutional right for same-sex couples to marry. The Con-
stitution protects the rights of minorities not only in aberrant situa-
tions, where "outlier" governmental actions offend mainstream
values, but also in cases where the overwhelming majority of the peo-
ple desire to infringe the constitutional right. A large majority of
Americans opposed interracial marriage; a large majority of Ameri-
cans do not approve of flag burning; and a large majority of Ameri-
cans favor government-led prayer in the public schools,5" but the
Supreme Court nevertheless acted to protect these rights under the
Equal Protection Clause, freedom of speech, and the Establishment
Clause respectively.51 To declare that same-sex couples have a right
to marry will not be a popular decision, but it is the correct decision.
6. To Recognize Same-Sex Marriage Would Violate the Rights of
Persons Who Disapprove of Homosexuality
Opponents of gay marriage may believe that their rights would be
violated if the government were to recognize same-sex unions, but in
of San Francisco and Mayor Jason West of New Paltz, New York "made national headlines"
when Newsome married nearly 4,000 and West married nearly two dozen same-sex couples in
February, 2004).
50. See Laws of the Land: A Brief History of Interracial Marriage and Race Classification in
America, available at http://www.pbs.org/weblab/lovestories/digdeeper/pressinfo6.shtml ("The
first Gallup poll conducted on the issue of interracial marriage was in 1958 and showed that 94%
of whites opposed such unions"); http://lstam.umn.edu/main/pubop/flag-burning.htm (last vis-
ited April 13, 2005) (listing a number of polls showing support for a constitutional amendment to
prohibit burning the American flag); The First Amendment in the Public Schools, available at
www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=13390 ("Nearly two-thirds of the
public (65%) agree that 'teachers or other public school officials should be allowed to lead
prayers in school.') (last visited April 13, 2005).
A similar majority favors the display of the Ten Commandments on government property. See
Will Lester, Justices to Rule on Commandments at the Courthouse, Cleveland Plain Dealer, page
A8, March 2, 2005 ("An Associated Press poll found 76 percent of Americans say such displays
ought to be allowed."). But see Flag Burning Poll Results Show Americans Opposed to Amend-
ing Constitution, available at http://www.tcn.net/-opticom/Steve/recent.htm, (last visited April
13, 2005) ("The poll first asked 635 registered voters whether they favor or oppose a new amend-
ment to prohibit the burning or other desecration of the American flag. Sixty-four percent said
they were in favor of such and amendment, and another 30 percent opposed it. But when asked
in a follow-up question if they would favor or oppose such an amendment if they knew that it
would be the first in our country's history to restrict freedom of speech and freedom of political
protest, the results were significantly different-Americans opposed such an amendment by 52 to
38 percent.").
51. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating Texas statute forbidding desecra-
tion of the American flag); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating Virginia statute
forbidding interracial marriage); School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(invalidating Pennsylvania statute and Maryland school board rule requiring readings from the
Bible in the public schools).
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fact same-sex marriage will not infringe the constitutional rights of
any other person. People do not have a constitutional right to enact
discriminatory laws.52 People have constitutional rights to freedom of
association, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion; however,
same-sex marriage will not interfere with any of these rights. If same-
sex marriage were legalized, no person could be required to associate
with same-sex couples socially.53 No private establishment that is not
a place of public accommodation could be required to admit same-sex
couples to the premises.54 No private organization of whose purposes
is to express opposition to homosexuality could be required to admit
same-sex couples as members. No religious body could be required
to admit same-sex couples to worship, nor could any cleric be required
to administer the sacrament of marriage to same-sex couples. Even
hate speech is protected under the Constitution unless it rises to the
level of incitement, fighting words, or true threats. 57  The First
Amendment and the right to privacy fully protect the constitutional
rights of persons who oppose gay marriage.
52. See Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 312, 341-342, 798 N.E.2d at 941 (observing that "[m]any
people hold deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical convictions that ... homosexual conduct is
immoral," but ruling that "[t]he Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it
tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect.") (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
53. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (holding right to privacy protects "inti-
mate and personal choices").
54. See generally PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (holding professional golf
tour to be a "public accommodation" within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities
Act).
55. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (invaliding New Jersey's public
accommodations law, on grounds of expressive association, as applied to action of Boy Scouts
dismissing homosexual scoutmaster).
56. See Presbytery of N.J. of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454 (3rd Cir.
1994) (affirming decision that action for declaratory judgment that New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination on basis of sexual orientation was inapplicable to church was not ripe, quoting
head of state agency, "the Division has not in the past prosecuted and has no intention to prose-
cute essentially exempt churches for sincerely-held religious belief or practice, or speech consis-
tent with such belief, or for a refusal to engage in certain speech or for following their religious
tenets.... Hence, the Division would not even attempt to enforce those provisions in the cir-
cumstances of sincerely-held religious reasons such as plaintiffs express here .. "). See also
Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 841, 853 (1992) (arguing against finding churches to be public accommodations); Jane
Rutherford, Religion, Rationality, and Special Treatment, 9 WILLIAM & MARY BILL RTs. J. 303,
334-335 (2001) (equating religious organizations with political organizations in their right to ex-
pressive association).
57. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (upholding Virginia statute prohibiting cross
burning with intent to intimidate); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (invalidating
ordinance which prohibited cross burning and use of other symbols which person has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969) (invalidating Ohio law as applied to speech by Ku Klux Klan leader as not rising to
the level of incitement of imminent and likely serious unlawfulness); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (upholding New Hampshire law punishing "fighting words").
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7. Ohio Issue 1 Is Not Directed Solely Against Same-Sex Marriage,
But Also Against Polygamy and Cohabitation
Ohio Issue 1 does not mention homosexuals or sexual orientation.
Therefore, supporters of the measure may assert that it was not in-
tended to single out homosexuals for differential treatment. The first
sentence of Ohio Issue 1 defines marriage as "the union of one man
and one woman," and it may be asserted that the law is aimed at
polygamists. However, this argument is not consistent with the over-
whelming thrust of the campaign that was waged to obtain passage of
this amendment. It was obvious to many in Ohio that proponents of
Issue 1 were opposed to homosexuality in general and to gay marriage
in particular. Believing the practice of homosexuality to be immoral,
their purpose was to prevent both the State of Ohio and any other
state from extending either the status or benefits of marriage to gay
and lesbian couples located within the state. Polygamists loom large
in Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Romer,58 but they were not an
evident presence during the 2004 election.
The second sentence of Ohio Issue 1 prohibits the extension of mar-
ital rights and benefits to "unmarried individuals," and accordingly
supporters of Issue 1 may contend that the measure was directed
against unmarried cohabitation generally, and not homosexuality.
This argument is supported by a decision of the Common Pleas Court
of Cuyahoga County in State v. Burk59 striking down the Ohio Do-
mestic Violence statute as applied to unmarried persons. The domes-
tic violence statute prohibits any person from assaulting "a family or
household member."6 The statute expressly includes "a person living
as a spouse" as "a family or household member,"61 and defines "a
person living as a spouse" as someone who "is cohabiting with the
offender."62 The Ohio Supreme Court has identified two attributes of
cohabitation: "(1) sharing of familial or financial responsibilities and
(2) consortium."63 In Burk, the Common Pleas Court ruled that the
domestic violence law created a legal status that approximates the de-
sign, qualities, significance, or effect of marriage, and that as applied
to unmarried individuals, this law was in conflict with Ohio Issue 1
and therefore unconstitutional.'
58. Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 648-651 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending it is inconsistent
to protect homosexuality under the Constitution without also protecting polygamy).
59. See State v. Burk, No.CR462510, 2005 WL 786212 (Ohio Com. P. March 23, 2005)
(striking down Ohio domestic violence law as applied to unmarried individuals).
60. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25(A) (West 2005).
61. Id. at § 2919.25(F)(1)(a)(i).
62. Id. at § 2919.25(F)(2).
63. State v. Williams, 683 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (Ohio 1997).
64. Burk, 2005 WL 786212, at *3.
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The ruling of the court in Burk was based upon the text and plain
meaning of Ohio Issue 1, however the court conceded that one could
argue that it was not the intent of Issue 1 to strike down the domestic
violence law as applied to unmarried individuals. The court stated, "It
may be argued that the intent of the second sentence was simply to
preclude recognition by the State of so-called 'domestic partnerships'
or 'civil unions' as a back-door means of sanctioning same-sex rela-
tionships."65 Consistent with this observation, the leading proponent
of Ohio Issue 1 as well as an opponent of the law have both indicated
that the constitutional amendment was not intended to prevent the
State from prosecuting unmarried individuals for the crime of domes-
tic violence.6 6 Regardless of what the text of Ohio Issue 1 says, the
purpose of the law was directed entirely at restricting the rights of
same-sex couples.
There is also a practical response to the argument that the second
sentence of Issue 1 was directed against all unmarried individuals, not
simply homosexuals. Heterosexual couples are free to marry. Under
Issue 1, homosexual couples are not. If a man and a woman wish to
undertake the obligations and secure the benefits of marriage, they
are free to do so; same-sex couples may not. No heterosexual couple
is burdened by this law; all same-sex couples are. This law does not
affect same-sex and opposite-sex couples equally.
8. It Is an "Insult" to Characterize Gay Rights as a Civil Rights
Movement
An argument that is being repeated against gay rights in general
and same-sex marriage in particular is that it is insulting or offensive
to classify these as movements for "civil rights."67
This is an argument which must be met forcefully, albeit with sensi-
tivity. First of all, the language of our fundamental charters clearly
includes the gay community. The Declaration of Independence says
that "All men are created equal."68 The Constitution begins with the
65. Id. at *4 ("However, by its explicit terms Art. XV, § 11, is not so limited, but clearly is
worded as broadly as possible, so as to encompass any quasi-marital relationships - whether they
be same-sex or opposite sex.").
66. See Connie Mabin, Two Sides Spar Over Ohio's Gay Wedding Ban, CINCINNATI POST,
March 25, 2005, at A, available at 2005 WLNR 4837349 (quoting Phil Burress, President of
Citizens for Community Values and chairman of the Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage as
saying "[t]hese (domestic violence) crimes should have the same penalty whether you're married
or not," and Camilla Taylor, a lawyer for Lambda Legal, a gay-rights advocacy group, as saying,
"[t]he people of Ohio I never intended to subject unmarried Ohioans to abuse in their own
homes, and I'm sure the courts will recognize this.").
67. See Jeff Ventrella, supra note 44 ("A lot of people are offended by this comparison.").
68. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, Para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
2005]
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words, "We the people."6 9 The Fourteenth Amendment declares that
"No person shall be deprived of life liberty or property ... nor shall
any state deny to any person the equal protection of the laws."7 Lib-
erty and equality are guaranteed to all people.
There is one aspect of this matter, however, that must be acknowl-
edged. The indignities and inequalities that homosexuals have been
and are being subjected to in our society cannot compare, either in
scope or in magnitude, to the institution of slavery as it existed in our
nation for ever so long.71 The centuries of chattel slavery, segregation,
and denial of basic civil rights endured by African-Americans in this
country are simply not comparable to the history of discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. On the other hand, no one would pre-
tend that constitutional protection extends only to race. The Constitu-
tion protects women72 as well as blacks.73 It protects the children of
illegal aliens, 74 the mentally handicapped, 75 and the practices of mi-
nority groups such as Jehovah's Witnesses 76 and the Amish.77 It even
protects groups who have substantial political power such as men 78
and white Americans. 79  To say that the movement for gay rights is
one for civil rights is not an insult to African-Americans or to any
other group. It simply reflects the fact that the Equal Protection
Clause protects all of us from unfair discrimination.
Speaking of insults, the gay and lesbian men and women who are
now striving for equality know something of insults. They have had to
endure this type of calumny and ridicule for a very long time and it is
time for it to stop.80 Do not let anyone tell you that it is an "insult" to
69. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
71. See generally WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET (1999); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ArNrE-
BELLUM SotHrr (1956).
72. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating Idaho statute preferring males
over females in the appointment of administrators of intestate estates).
73. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (invalidating West Virginia stat-
ute limiting jury service to whites).
74. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (invalidating Texas statute that authorized school
districts to require undocumented children to pay tuition to attend public school).
75. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidating municipal zon-
ing ordinance requiring homes for the mentally retarded to obtain a special use permit).
76. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating West
Virginia statute requiring all public school students to salute and pledge allegiance to the flag).
77. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidating Wisconsin statute imposing
compulsory school attendance to age 16 as applied to Amish).
78. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating Oklahoma statute establish-
ing higher drinking age for males than for females).
79. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (invalidating affirmative action admis-
sions policy of a public undergraduate college).
80. Justice Scalia implies that for constitutional purposes homosexuality is indistinguishable
from "bestiality." See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stat-
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be associated with homosexuals. This is bigotry, pure and simple. I
am proud to be associated with the efforts of these brave gay and
lesbian men and women.
An associated argument raised by opponents of same-sex marriage
is that the Loving decision,81 which struck down laws prohibiting in-
terracial marriage, cannot be extended beyond the concept of race.
82
But this was not the understanding of Thurgood Marshall, who as the
attorney for the NAACP won the Loving case and many other civil
rights cases in the Supreme Court of the United States.83 Later, as a
Justice of the Supreme Court, Marshall said, "Although Loving arose
in the context of racial discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions
of this Court confirm that the right to marry is of fundamental impor-
tance for all individuals."84 Most importantly, Marshall joined Justice
William Brennan's dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari in a
case involving the dismissal of a public school teacher for disclosing
her homosexuality to other teachers8 5 and joined Justice Harry Black-
mun's dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick.86 Justice Marshall apparently
did not feel insulted to recognize the civil rights of homosexuals.
87
ing, "State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation,
adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers'
validation of laws based on moral choices."); see also id. at 599 ("The Texas statute undeniably
seeks to further the belief of its citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are 'immoral and
unacceptable,' - the same interest furthered by criminal laws against fornication, bigamy, adul-
tery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity.") (citation omitted). Justice Scalia's most offensive
and morally obtuse comment on this matter is his use of the argument that "there are... records
of... 4 executions [for sodomy] during the colonial period," without any condemnation of those
events. Id.
81. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating Virginia statute prohibiting intermar-
riage by whites with other races).
82. See Jeff Ventrella, supra note 44 "Don't buy that analogy," (Video at 28:30).
83. See JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL, AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY (1998).
84. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (invalidating
Wisconsin statute prohibiting any person from marrying if he or she had an obligation to support
children not in his or her custody, absent judicial finding that the children were not likely to
become public charges).
85. See Rowland v. Mad River School Dist., Montgomery County., Ohio, 470 U.S. 1009,
1014 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dissenting from denial of certiorari in case involving public
school teacher dismissed because of her homosexuality, and stating, "discrimination against
homosexuals or bisexuals based solely on their sexual preference raises significant constitutional
questions under both prongs of our settled equal protection analysis").
86. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87. See Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Symposium, The Life and Jurisprudence of Justice Thurgood
Marshall: Separating Prejudice from Rationality in Equal Protection Cases: A Legacy of
Thurgood Marshall, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 93 (1994) (noting Marshall's dissenting position in Bowers
and stating, "If Justice Marshall's realism can be linked persuasively and durably to moderate
pragmatism, then perhaps there is reason for hope that such decisions as Bowers v. Hardwick are
not the last word on one civil rights issue of the 1990s: Discrimination against the homosexual.").
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9. Sexual Orientation is Not Immutable
The Supreme Court subjects laws which distinguish people on the
basis of race and gender to heightened judicial review in part because
race and gender are "immutable" characteristics.88 Racial classifica-
tions are said to be "suspect"89 and are subjected to strict scrutiny,90
while gender is considered to be a "quasi-suspect classification,"91 and
laws treating men and women differently are evaluated by the stan-
dard of "intermediate scrutiny. ' 92 A common argument against gay
rights in general or same-sex marriage in particular is that sexual ori-
entation cannot be a "suspect classification" because sexual orienta-
tion is not immutable like race or gender, but rather is a matter of
choice. 93 This argument has some force in that the Supreme Court
has decided four cases on gay rights issues, two against gay rights and
two in favor, but in none of those cases has the Court declared that
sexual orientation is a suspect or quasi-suspect classification.94 How-
ever, there are several responses to this argument.
First, most people probably do not consider their own sexual orien-
tation to have been a matter of choice, and therefore they may not
accept the factual premise of this argument. If the Court were to find
that sexual orientation is, for the most part, not a matter of choice,
then the Court would be more inclined to hold that sexual orientation
88. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) ("Moreover, since sex, like race and
national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the
imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would
seem to violate 'the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship
to individual responsibility .. '") (citation omitted).
89. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, (1944) ("All legal restrictions which cur-
tail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.").
90. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) ("Federal racial classifica-
tions, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly
tailored to further that interest.").
91. See Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 325 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) ("Of course, the Court is quite right in suggesting that distinctions exist between the elderly
and traditional suspect classes such as Negroes, and between the elderly and "quasi-suspect"
classes such as women or illegitimates.").
92. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("classifications by gender must serve im-
portant governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives").
93. See, e.g., Eugene R. Milhizer, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell": A Qualified Defense, 21 HOF-
sTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 349, 398 n.231 (2004) ( "Important differences between race, and sexual
orientation and conduct, can be readily drawn. Race is an immutable characteristic; sexual orien-
tation and action is a behavior and a choice, which can change over time.").
94. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating Texas statute criminalizing
homosexual conduct); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (invalidating New
Jersey public accommodations law as applied to Boy Scouts' exclusion of homosexual scoutmas-
ter); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating Colorado constitutional amendment
prohibiting state and local government from adopting nondiscrimination laws and policies pro-
tecting homosexuals); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia statute
criminalizing sodomy as applied to homosexuals).
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is a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, because sexual orientation
meets the other criteria previously established for protected status:
there has been a history of discrimination against homosexuals; they
have suffered the legal disability that homosexual conduct was illegal;
they are stigmatized and stereotyped; they are a discrete and insular
minority; they are relatively politically powerless, as the recent elec-
tion results prove; and sexual orientation bears little or no relationship
to the ability to perform socially useful activity.95 It is at least argua-
ble that sexual orientation qualifies as a suspect classification.96
Furthermore, suspect class status is not a necessary qualification for
constitutional protection, as shown by the fact that neither Romer v.
Evans nor Lawrence v. Texas is premised upon such a judgment.97
Similarly, the arguments that are set forth in the first part of this arti-
cle do not depend upon a finding that homosexuals are a suspect class
or that sexual orientation is a suspect classification. Instead, it is ar-
gued that neither the right to marry nor the right to seek aid from the
government may be arbitrarily denied.98 If these rights are considered
to be fundamental rights, then the government must justify laws re-
stricting these rights under the strict scrutiny test. Even if strict scru-
tiny or intermediate scrutiny does not apply, under the rational basis
test the government would still have to plausibly assert some legiti-
95. See Rowland v. Mad River School Dist., Montgomery County., Ohio, 470 U.S. 1009,
1014 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("First, homosexuals constitute a
significant and insular minority of this country's population. Because of the immediate and se-
vere opprobrium often manifested against homosexuals once so identified publicly, members of
this group are particularly powerless to pursue their rights openly in the political arena. Moreo-
ver, homosexuals have historically been the object of pernicious and sustained hostility, and it is
fair to say that discrimination against homosexuals is 'likely... to reflect deep-seated prejudice
rather than ... rationality.' State action taken against members of such groups based simply on
their status as members of the group traditionally has been subjected to strict, or at least height-
ened, scrutiny by this Court.") (citation omitted). See generally Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-446 (1985) (discussing elements of suspectness as applied to the mentally
retarded); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-688 (1973) (discussing elements of suspect-
ness as applied to women).
96. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-442, 446. The Supreme Court has been reluctant to recog-
nize any more protected classes. The court declined to find that the mentally retarded was a
suspect or quasi-suspect class, and noted that the Court had declined to extend suspect class
status to the aged, stating, "The lesson of Murgia is that where individuals in the group affected
by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to
implement, the courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with
our respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether,
how, and to what extent those interests should be pursued. In such cases, the Equal Protection
Clause requires only a rational means to serve a legitimate end." Id. citing Mass. Bd. of Retire-
ment v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
97. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (invalidating Texas statute criminalizing homosexual con-
duct because it is unsupported by a legitimate state interest under the Due Process Clause);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (invalidating Colorado constitutional amendment
under Equal Protection because it fails the rational basis test).
98. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
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mate reason for denying same-sex couples the right to marry and the
right to seek the legal benefits of marriage, and no such legitimate
reason has ever been proposed. Suspect class analysis is not necessary
to support constitutional protection for same-sex marriage.
Finally, even if sexual orientation were a matter of choice, it would
not detract from the validity of the constitutional argument in favor of
same-sex marriage, because choice is the essence of liberty. We are
free to fall in love with any other consenting adult; we are free to
choose whom to marry; and the government may not tell us to make
another choice.
10. Romer v. Evans Can Be Distinguished from this Case
Supporters of Issue 1 may attempt to argue that Romer v. Evans can
be distinguished from a case considering the constitutionality of the
second sentence of Ohio Issue 1. This argument will face an uphill
battle. Both Romer and such a case involve the constitutionality of a
state constitutional amendment that makes it more difficult for homo-
sexuals to obtain the adoption of favorable laws or policies. If there is
any difference between the two cases, it must lie in the difference be-
tween Colorado Amendment 2 and Ohio Issue 1.
Colorado Amendment 2 prohibited the state and its political subdi-
visions from adopting nondiscrimination laws and policies, while the
second sentence of Ohio Issue 1 prohibits the state and its political
subdivisions from extending the benefits of marriage to homosexual
couples.9 9 The effect of the Colorado law was to legalize discrimina-
tion by public and private parties in the areas of housing, employment,
education, and health and welfare services, 100 while the Ohio law
mandates discrimination by state and local government against same-
sex couples with respect to marriage and marital benefits. If anything,
the Ohio law cuts more deeply into the Constitution than the Colo-
rado law does. The Ohio law requires discrimination by the govern-
ment, whereas the Colorado law only permitted it. The Ohio law
applies only to government action, while the Colorado law also applied
to the acts of private parties, which are not constitutionally pro-
99. Compare Colorado Amendment 2, supra note 16, with Ohio Issue 1, supra text accom-
panying note 1.
100. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-624 ("The impetus for the amendment and the contentious
campaign that preceded its adoption came in large part from ordinances that had been passed in
various Colorado municipalities. For example, the cities of Aspen and Boulder and the city and
County of Denver each had enacted ordinances which banned discrimination in many transac-
tions and activities, including housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and
health and welfare services.").
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scribed.' 1 And the Ohio law infringes upon the right to marry, which
is a fundamental right, 10 2 whereas the Colorado law concerned hous-
ing, employment, education, and health and welfare services, which
are not fundamental rights.1 "3 Romer cannot be distinguished in a
manner that would support the constitutionality of Ohio Issue 1. In-
stead, it appears that there is an even stronger case for invalidating
Ohio Issue 1 than there was for invalidating Colorado Amendment 2.
11. Romer v. Evans Should Be Overruled
Because Romer cannot be distinguished, supporters of Issue 1 must
necessarily argue that Romer was wrongly decided. However, Romer
stands upon a solid legal foundation. There are two independent lines
of cases that support the decision of the Supreme Court in Romer.
The first line of cases establishes the unconstitutionality of laws that
distort the structure of the governmental decision-making process to
the detriment of an identifiable minority group. °4 The second line of
cases forbids the government from taking action against an identifi-
able group purely because of dislike, disapproval, or irrational fear.105
The first line of cases begins with the 1967 decision in Reitman v.
Mulkey10 6 condemning laws that result in a discriminatory structuring
of the governmental process. In Reitman the Supreme Court consid-
ered a California constitutional amendment that prohibited the adop-
tion of any law that would interfere with the absolute discretion of any
101. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating Civil Rights Act of 1875 because
Congress lacks authority under Section 5 of 14th Amendment to enact legislation regulating the
actions of private individuals and organizations).
102. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
103. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding federal regulation restricting fund-
ing of abortions under Medicaid, and stating, "just because government may not prohibit the use
of contraceptives or prevent parents from sending their child to a private school, government,
therefore, has an affirmative constitutional obligation to ensure that all persons have the finan-
cial resources to obtain contraceptives or send their children to private schools."); Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding state law restricting use of Medicaid funds to pay for abortions);
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding unequal funding of
public schools, stating, "whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financing
system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children, that
argument provides no basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only rela-
tive differences in spending levels are involved .... ); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)
(upholding Oregon Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, stating, "We are unable to perceive [in the
Constitution] any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings .... "); Dandridge v. Williams,
398 U.S. 914 (1970) (upholding state regulation imposing a cap of $275 per month upon AFDC
payments regardless of family size and actual need, and stating, "here we deal with state regula-
tion in the social and economic field, not affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights).
104. See supra notes 101-103 and infra notes 105-115 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 119-128 and accompanying text.
106. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
23
Huhn: Ohio Issue 1 Is Unconstitutional
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2005
24 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:1
person to sell or rent his property to another person. 07 The Court
found that this amendment was intended to encourage private acts of
racial discrimination, and for that reason it was struck down as uncon-
stitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. °8
A similar law was examined in Hunter v. Erickson,1 9 where the vot-
ers of a municipality had adopted a charter amendment prohibiting
the enactment of any fair housing law absent a referendum of the vot-
ers.110 This charter amendment, like the constitutional amendment in
Reitman, was not a mere repeal of a civil rights law - it did not simply
return the city to the constitutional baseline - but it also made it
harder to enact fair housing laws,"' and for that reason it was struck
down. 1
12
This principle was extended from laws to policies in the case of
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1.113 In that case a statewide
initiative had been enacted prohibiting any local school district from
adopting a voluntary program of busing students for integration, un-
107. See id. at 371 (quoting state constitutional amendment which provided: "Neither the
State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the
right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real
property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his
absolute discretion, chooses.").
108. See id. at 381 (stating, "The California Supreme Court believes that the section will
significantly encourage and involve the State in private discriminations. We have been presented
with no persuasive considerations indicating that these judgments should be overturned.").
109. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (invalidating Akron city charter amendment
prohibiting the city council from enacting fair housing ordinances except with the concurrence of
a referendum of voters).
110. The charter amendment provided:
"Any ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron which regulates the use, sale,
advertisement, transfer, listing assignment, lease, sublease or financing of real property of
any kind or of any interest therein on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or
ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the electors voting on the question at a
regular or general election before said ordinance shall be effective. Any such ordinance in
effect at the time of the adoption of this section shall cease to be effective until approved by
the electors as provided herein.".
See id. at 387.
111. The majority opinion noted that:
The City of Akron ... not only suspended the operation of the existing ordinance forbid-
ding housing discrimination, but also required the approval of the electors before any future
ordinance could take effect... [t]hus we do not hold that mere repeal of an existing ordi-
nance violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
See id. at 392-393 & n.5 (alteration in original).
112. Justice White stated in his majority opinion that:
Even though Akron might have proceeded by majority vote at town meeting on all its mu-
nicipal legislation, it has instead chosen a more complex system. Having done so, the State
may no more disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to enact legisla-
tion in its behalf than it may dilute any person's vote or give any group a smaller representa-
tion than another of comparable size.
See id. at 392-393.
113. Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (invalidating Washington
initiative prohibiting transportation of students for reasons other than special education, over-
crowding, or lack of necessary physical facilities).
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less the busing was required under the Constitution of the United
States.114 The constitutionality of the law was challenged by the Seat-
tle School District, because the district had chosen to adopt a policy of
affirmatively desegregating its schools.1 5 The statewide initiative was
declared unconstitutional because the state had committed virtually
all other questions of educational policy to the discretion of local
school boards; people who wanted to change educational policy with
respect to other matters could appeal to their local school boards, but
those who wanted a voluntary program of busing for integration were
foreclosed from doing SO.116
The essence of the constitutional violation in Reitman, Hunter, and
Seattle School District was that there were different rules for different
people. No good reason was advanced why it should be more difficult
for one group to win the enactment of legislation or the adoption of
policies than for another group to do so, and for this reason the law
114. Justice Thomas stated that the opponents of busing for integration
drafted a statewide initiative designed to terminate the use of mandatory busing for pur-
poses of racial integration. This proposal, known as Initiative 350, provided that "no school
board ... shall directly or indirectly require any student to attend a school other than the
school which is geographically nearest or next nearest the student's place of residence...
and which offers the course of study pursued by such student .. " The initiative then set
out, however, a number of broad exceptions to this requirement: a student may be assigned
beyond his neighborhood school if he "requires special education, care or guidance," or if
"there are health or safety hazards, either natural or man made, or physical barriers or
obstacles . . . between the student's place of residence and the nearest or next nearest
school," or if "the school nearest or next nearest to his place of residence is unfit or inade-
quate because of overcrowding, unsafe conditions or lack of physical facilities." Initiative
350 also specifically proscribed use of seven enumerated methods of "indirec[t]" student
assignment-among them the redefinition of attendance zones, the pairing of schools, and
the use of "feeder" schools - that are a part of the Seattle Plan. The initiative envisioned
busing for racial purposes in only one circumstance: it did not purport to "prevent any court
of competent jurisdiction from adjudicating constitutional issues relating to the public
schools."
See id. at 462-463 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
115. See id. at 461 ("in March 1978, the School Board enacted the so-called 'Seattle Plan' for
desegregation. The plan, which makes extensive use of busing and mandatory reassignments,
desegregates elementary schools by 'pairing' and 'triading' predominantly minority with
predominantly white attendance areas, and by basing student assignments on attendance zones
rather than on race.").
116. The majority opinion made this clear in stating:
We are also satisfied that the practical effect of Initiative 350 is to work a reallocation of
power of the kind condemned in Hunter. The initiative removes the authority to address a
racial problem - and only a racial problem - from the existing decision-making body, in
such a way as to burden minority interests. Those favoring the elimination of de facto school
segregation now must seek relief from the state legislature, or from the statewide electorate.
Yet authority over all other student assignment decisions, as well as over most other areas of
educational policy, remains vested in the local school board. Indeed, by specifically exempt-
ing from Initiative 350's proscriptions most nonracial reasons for assigning students away
from their neighborhood schools, the initiative expressly requires those championing school
integration to surmount a considerably higher hurdle than persons seeking comparable leg-
islative action.
See id. at 474.
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that distorted the process of governmental decision-making was struck
down in each case.
There are obvious parallels between the Colorado constitutional
amendment that was at stake in Romer and the state constitutional
amendment, city charter amendment, and statewide initiative that
were struck down in Reitman, Hunter, and Seattle School District.
Colorado Amendment 2, like the laws that were considered in Reit-
man, Hunter, and Seattle School District, made it more difficult for a
minority group to achieve the adoption of civil rights laws and poli-
cies: the Colorado amendment made it impossible for homosexuals to
obtain the adoption of antidiscrimination laws and policies while al-
lowing other groups the opportunity to do so.117 Relying in part upon
Reitman, Hunter, and Seattle School District, the Colorado Supreme
Court declared the Colorado constitutional amendment to be
unconstitutional. 118
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the Colorado Supreme Court in Romer; but Justice Kennedy,
speaking for the members of the majority, stated that in declaring the
Colorado law unconstitutional the Supreme Court was not invoking
the same rationale used by the Colorado Supreme Court, which had
found this case to be controlled by Reitman, Hunter, and Seattle
School District."9 The decision of the federal Supreme Court not to
follow the reasoning of the state supreme court was made for a very
good reason. Reitman, Hunter, and Seattle School District all con-
cerned laws that made it more difficult for racial minorities to enact
protective legislation. Since the Colorado amendment obviously did
not discriminate on the basis of race, the United States Supreme
Court declined to follow the reasoning of the Colorado Supreme
Court, possibly because it was not ready to draw the analogy between
racial discrimination and discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion. Instead, the Court in Romer invoked a different rule, far
broader than the standard that had evolved in the earlier trio of cases,
by holding that the Colorado constitutional amendment lacked a legit-
117. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (noting that under Amendment 2,
"Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint.").
118. The Court recognized the state supreme court's holding which held:
Amendment 2 was subject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment because it
infringed the fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate in the political process.
To reach this conclusion, the state court relied on our voting rights cases, and on our prece-
dents involving discriminatory restructuring of governmental decision-making.
See id. at 625 (citations omitted).
119. See id. at 626 (stating, "We granted certiorari, and now affirm the judgment, but on a
rationale different from that adopted by the State Supreme Court.") (citations omitted).
26
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 [2005], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol28/iss1/3
2005] OHIO ISSUE 1 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
imate purpose, and thereby failed examination under the lowest level
of constitutional scrutiny, the rational basis test.1 2
A key requirement of the rational basis test is that the law must
serve a legitimate governmental objective. In determining the pur-
pose of Colorado Amendment 2, the Court in Romer found that the
actual intent of the law was to discriminate against homosexuals, and
did not accept the purported interests suggested by the State of Colo-
rado that it was conserving prosecutorial resources for use in other
discrimination cases or that it was protecting the privacy interests of
Colorado residents who wished to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation. 121 In this regard the decision of the Supreme Court in
Romer mirrored the reasoning of the Reitman and Seattle School Dis-
trict decisions. Even though the laws that were considered in Reitman
and Seattle School District were neutral on their face, the Court found
that each law was motivated by an intent to deprive a minority group
of the opportunity to achieve its political goals.122  Similarly, in
120. Justice Kennedy stated:
We conclude that, in addition to the far-reaching deficiencies of Amendment 2 that we have
noted, the principles it offends, in another sense, are conventional and venerable; a law
must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose .... We cannot say
that Amendment 2 is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective.
See id. at 635 (citations omitted).
121. The majority opinion's exact words were as follows:
The primary rationale the State offers for Amendment 2 is respect for other citizens' free-
dom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have per-
sonal or religious objections to homosexuality. Colorado also cites its interest in conserving
resources to fight discrimination against other groups. The breadth of the amendment is so
far removed from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them....
We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legis-
lative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.
See id.
122. The California constitutional amendment evaluated in Reitman simply referred to per-
sons choosing to sell or rent to other persons for any reason. See supra notes 107 and accompa-
nying text. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that, in light of the context in which the amendment
was adopted, there was evidence that the amendment was intended to encourage private acts of
racial discrimination:
Here the California court, armed as it was with the knowledge of the facts and circum-
stances concerning the passage and potential impact of [the state constitutional amend-
ment], and familiar with the milieu in which that provision would operate, has determined
that the provision would involve the State in private racial discriminations to an unconstitu-
tional degree. We accept this holding of the California court.
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378-379 (1967) (alterations in original). The Washington State
initiative considered in Seattle School District, on its face, merely prohibited transportation of
students for reasons other than special education or overcrowding, without expressly mentioning
bussing for integration, but the Court concluded that the racially discriminatory purpose of the
legislation was apparent from the context:
Noting that Initiative 350 nowhere mentions "race" or "integration," appellants suggest that
the legislation has no racial overtones; they maintain that Hunter is inapposite because the
initiative simply permits busing for certain enumerated purposes while neutrally forbidding
it for all other reasons. We find it difficult to believe that appellants' analysis is seriously
advanced, however, for despite its facial neutrality there is little doubt that the initiative was
effectively drawn for racial purposes. Neither the initiative's sponsors, nor the District
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Romer, the state constitutional amendment did not on its face express
any negative opinion towards homosexuals, but the intent of the law
was apparent from the circumstances surrounding its adoption, and it
was this intent which made the law unconstitutional. 23
The legitimacy of the government's intent is the determining factor
in the second line of cases, which support the Court's decision in
Romer. These cases forbid discrimination for its own sake, and stand
for the proposition that it is unconstitutional for the government to
treat one group differently from another because of animosity, irra-
tional prejudice, irrational fear, moral disapproval, or a desire to harm
the other group of people.
The first case of this type was U.S. Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno,2 4 in which the Court invalidated a provision of the Food
Stamp Act that excluded people from eligibility if they resided with
unrelated individuals.125 Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan
noted that the legislative history indicated that the purpose of the law
was to prevent "hippies" and "hippy communes" from receiving food
stamps. 126 Justice Brennan stated:
[I]f the constitutional conception of "equal protection of the laws"
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congres-
sional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest. 127
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,1 28 the Court struck
down a municipal zoning ordinance which required group homes for
the mentally retarded, but not nursing homes for the infirm or the
elderly, to annually obtain a special use permit.129 Writing for the ma-
Court, nor the Court of Appeals had any difficulty perceiving the racial nature of the issue
settled by Initiative 350. Thus, the District Court found that the text of the initiative was
carefully tailored to interfere only with desegregative busing .... It is beyond reasonable
dispute, then, that the initiative was enacted "'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its ad-
verse effects upon" busing for integration.
Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457, 471 (1982) (citations omitted). In Hunter, the
city charter amendment expressly mentioned race. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 387 (1969);
see supra notes 110 and accompanying text.
123. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
124. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
125. See id. at 529 (Brennan, J.) ("This case requires us to consider the constitutionality of
§ 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, which, with certain exceptions, excludes from participa-
tion in the food stamp program any household containing an individual who is unrelated to any
other member of the household.") (citations omitted).
126. See id. at 534 (Brennan, J.) (stating, "The legislative history that does exist, however,
indicates that that amendment was intended to prevent socalled[sic] 'hippies' and 'hippie com-
munes' from participating in the food stamp program.").
127. Id. (emphasis added) (alteration in original).
128. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
129. See id. at 436, n3 (setting forth municipal ordinance permitting the following uses in the
location of the proposed group home: "Apartment houses, or multiple dwellings; Boarding and
lodging houses; Fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories; Apartment hotels; Hospitals, sani-
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jority, Justice White found that "requiring the permit in this case ap-
pears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally
retarded,"' 3 ° and Justice John Paul Stevens, in a concurring opinion,
stated that "the record convinces me that this permit was required
because of the irrational fears of neighboring property owners. "131
The two Supreme Court decisions protecting the rights of homosex-
uals incorporated this reasoning. In Romer, Justice Kennedy noted
that "laws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that
the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of per-
son affected. 132 In Lawrence, Justice O'Connor, in her concurring
opinion, extended the category of illegitimate governmental purposes
to include "moral disapproval." She explained why moral disap-
proval, by itself, is not a "legitimate" governmental interest in the fol-
lowing passage:
Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental in-
terest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications
must not be "drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group bur-
dened by the law." Texas' invocation of moral disapproval as a legiti-
mate state interest proves nothing more than Texas' desire to
criminalize homosexual sodomy. But the Equal Protection Clause pre-
vents a State from creating "a classification of persons undertaken for
its own sake." And because Texas so rarely enforces its sodomy law as
applied to private, consensual acts, the law serves more as a statement
of dislike and disapproval against homosexuals than as a tool to stop
criminal behavior. The Texas sodomy law "raise[s] the inevitable in-
ference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected.",1 3
In summary, the Court's decision in Romer is supported by two in-
dependent lines of authority: the Reitman line of cases, which hold
that it is unconstitutional to distort the governmental decision-making
process to the detriment of a minority group, and the Moreno line of
cases, which hold that a bare desire to harm a group, or moral disap-
proval of it, is not a sufficient reason to support the constitutionality
of a law. Neither rationale has been questioned by the Court. Romer
is still good law, and it makes the second sentence of Ohio Issue 1
unconstitutional.
tariums, nursing homes or homes for convalescents or aged, other than for the insane or feeble-
minded or alcoholics or drug addicts; Private clubs or fraternal orders, except those whose chief
activity is carried on as a business; Philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions, other than penal
institutions.") (emphasis in case, not in original ordinance) (numbering omitted).
130. Id. at 450.
131. Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring).
132. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
133. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
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III. CONCLUSION
On December 12, 1953, the Justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States met in conference to discuss the momentous case which
was then before the Court: Brown v. Board of Education.134  Earl
Warren, the newly-appointed Chief Justice, presided over the confer-
ence. In presenting Brown to his fellow justices, Warren framed the
issue before the Court not solely in legal terms, but also in moral
terms. He told his colleagues:
[T]he more I've read and heard and thought, the more I've come to
conclude that the basis of segregation and "separate but equal" rests
upon a concept of the inherent inferiority of the colored race. I don't
see how Plessy and the cases following it can be sustained on any
other theory. If we are to sustain segregation, we must do it upon that
basis. 13
5
In cases such as Dred Scott v. Sandford1 3 6 and Plessy v. Ferguson137
the Supreme Court upheld racial segregation based on the intent of
the framers, longstanding judicial precedent, and cultural traditions,13 8
but these arguments failed in Brown because they were implicitly pre-
mised upon the supposed inequality of the races, a premise that the
Court emphatically rejected in Brown.1 39 Since the Court's decision in
Brown, the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause has not been
controlled by tradition or precedent, but rather by a careful evaluation
of whether the groups who are being treated differently by the law are
different in fact.14
0
134. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
135. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 292 (1995).
136. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (invalidating Missouri Compromise on the
ground that it interfered with the property rights of slaveholders to bring slaves into the territo-
ries of the United States).
137. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana statute requiring the seg-
regation of the races in railroad cars).
138. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550 (upholding racial segregation in part because it was consis-
tent with "the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people."); Plessy, 163 U.S. at
542-548 (citing judicial precedent upholding laws requiring the separation of the races); See Dred
Scott at 407 (justifying decision upholding extension of slavery into the territories of the United
States by ascribing racist views to the framers of the Constitution).
139. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489-490 (1954) (referring to the post-civil war
period, stating, "In the South, the movement toward free common schools, supported by general
taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of private
groups. Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiter-
ate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast,
many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences as well as in the busi-
ness and professional world.").
140. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 545 (1996) (striking down century-old
male-only admission policy of Virginia Military Institute, a public military college, on the ground
that the State of Virginia had failed to offer an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the
discriminatory admissions policy).
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Same-sex couples are not different in fact from heterosexual
couples, and as a result they may not be treated differently by the law.
Therefore, Ohio Issue 1 should be held unconstitutional.
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